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The Parameters of the 
Right to Counsel 
and 
Its Application in Civil 
Contempt Proceedings 
by Joseph Bernstein 
I. Parameters of the Right to 
Counsel for the Accused in the 
Prosecution of Any Criminal Offense. 
The modem history of the right to 
counsel began with Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which 
overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 
(1942), and established the constitu-
tional right to counsel for anyone prose-
cuted of a felony by a state. The Sixth 
Amendment, which in enumerated situ-
ations has been made applicable to the 
states by reason of the Fourteenth 
Amendent, has recently been extended 
to include the right to counsel whenever 
the possibility of incarceration exists, 
whether the offense is classified as petty, 
misdemeanor or felony. Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The ques-
tion arises as to how far that doctrine will 
be allowed to expand. 
The right to the assistance of counsel 
for one accused of any criminal offense 
where the possibility of incarceration 
exists is now guaranteed by the holding 
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 
37. The petitioner, an indigent, was 
charged in Florida with the offense of 
carrying a concealed weapon. Such of-
fense was punishable by imprisonment 
up to six-months and a fine of one 
thousand dollars. At his trial before a 
judge, the petitioner was unrepresented 
by counsel. After being sentenced to 90 
days in jail, the petitioner sought his re-
lease under habeas corpus proceedings. 
The Florida Supreme Court denied his 
appeal and held that the right to court-
appointed counsel, as was provided in 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 
(1968), extended only to trials "for non-
petty offenses punishable by more than six 
months imprisonment." 407 U.S., at 27. 
The Supreme Court reversed the 
Florida courts. In ruling on the right to 
counsel, the Court stated that "[tlhe as-
sistance of counsel is often a requisite to 
the very existence of a fair trial." 407 
U.S., at 31. The Sixth Amendment's 
"requirement of counsel may well be 
necessary to a fair trial even in a petty-
offense prosecution. We are by no 
means convinced that legal and constitu-
tional questions involved in a case that 
actually leads to imprisonment even for 
a brief period are any less complex than 
when a person can be sent off for six 
months or more." 407 U.S., at 33. And, 
in discussing guilty pleas, the Court said, 
"[cl ounsel is needed so that the accused 
may know precisely what he is doing, so 
that he is fully aware of the prospect of 
going to jail or in prison, and so that he is 
treated fairly by the prosecution." 407 
U.S., at 34. 
The holding inArgersinger v. Hamlin, 
supra, was even held applicable retroac-
tively in Berry v. Cincinnatti, 414 U.S. 
29 (1973). The Supreme Court held that 
persons convicted of misdemeanors 
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, 
were entitled to the Constitutional rule 
enunciated there " .. .if they allege and 
prove a bona fide, existing case or con-
troversy sufficient to invoke the jurisdic-
tion of a federal court." 414 U.S., at 
29-30. 
Argersinger v. :-famlin, supra, has 
been consistently followed in all sub-
sequent Supreme Court cases to date, 
except for the distinguishing remarks in 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 
(1973). Taken at its face value, the hold-
ing in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, may 
have been thought to place a limitation 
on the guarantees to assistance of coun-
sel for one who might be thrown into jail. 
Specifically, " ... the need for counsel 
must be made on a case-by-case basis in 
the exercise of a sound discretion by the 
state authority charged with responsibil-
ity for administering the probation and 
parole system." 411 U. S., at 790. But, if 
this was designed to limit the expansion 
of the Argersinger doctrine, why was it 
not specifically so started? In fact, the 
Gagon v. Scarpelli Court only men-
tioned the Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, 
case twice, both at 411 U.S., at 788. 
The factual setting in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, supra, seems to proVide the 
answer. The respondent, Gerald Scar-
pelli, pleaded guilty in July, 1965, to a 
charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin. 
He was sentenced by the trial judge to 
serve fifteen years in prison, but was 
placed on probation for seven years in 
lieu of imprisonment. The next month 
respondent was arrested by the Illinois 
police in the course of a burglary of a 
house. He admitted his guilt after being 
informed of his constitutional rights. The 
respondent's probation was revoked by 
the Wisconsin probation authorities 
without a hearin~ and, thereafter, the 
respondent started to serve the fifteen 
years to which he had been sentenced 
by the trial judge. No hearing was af-
fored to the respondent during the entire 
probation revocation process. 411 U.S., 
at 778-780. The Supreme Court held 
this to be an error, 411 U.S., at 782, as 
did the Court of Appeals and the District 
Court, 411 U.S., at 780. 
But, the appointment of counsel for 
an indigent probationer was decided dif-
ferently by the Supreme Court than in 
the lower federal courts. The Supreme 
Court said, " ... the Court of Appeals 
erred in accepting respondent's conten-
tion that the State is under a constitu-
tional duty to provide counsel for indi-
gents in all probation or parole revoca-
tion cases." 411 U.S., at 787. A case-
by-case approach was considered 
necessary to determine the necessity of 
counsel for indigent probationers or 
parolees. 411 U.S., at 790. The Sup-
reme Court's reasoning in denying re-
spondent the right to the assistance of 
counsel was based on the differences be-
tween a criminal trial and a probation or 
parole revocation hearing. "[Wle deal 
here not with the right of an accused to 
counsel in a criminal prosecution, but 
with the more limited due process right 
of one who is a probationer or parolee 
only because he has been convicted of a 
crime." 411 U.S., at 789. The case-by-
case approach to the appointment of 
counsel was therefore limited to the re-
vocation hearing and is not a limitation 
on the right to the assistance of counsel 
for an accused at his trial. 
The Gagnon v. Scarpelli Court placed 
greater emphasis in two other probation 
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or parole revocation cases, Mempa v. 
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) and 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 
(1972), than it did in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, supra. The rights of the pro-
bationer or parolee at a revocation hear-
ing were seen to be sufficiently different 
from the rights of an accused who is 
standing trial for the first time. Assuredly 
the Fourteenth Amendment's require-
ments of "due process of law" apply in 
favor of probationers and parolees at re-
vocation hearings, as well as in cases of 
persons standing trial for the first time. 
But, different due process rights are af-
forded at revocation hearings and at 
trials. For instance, the right of counsel 
for a probationer at his revocation hear-
ing is not always assured "".where the 
probationer was sentenced at the time of 
trial." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S., at 
781. And, 
"".no person may be imprisoned 
for any offense, whether classified 
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, 
unless he was represented by 
counsel at his trial." 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 37. 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, and 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, both con-
sider the concept of loss of freedom due 
to incarceration. Their conclusions are at 
variance with respect to the right of assis-
tance of counsel, as demonstrated 
supra, but the idea of loss of freedom is 
not dispensed with. As is pointed out in 
Gagnon, "[plrobation revocation, like 
parole revocation, is not a stage of a 
criminal prosecution, but does result in a 
loss of liberty." 411 U.S., at 782. Arger-
singer v. Hamlin, supra, states emphati-
cally that the rationale of Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and of 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963), have "relevance to any criminal 
trial, where an accused is deprived of his 
liberty." 407 U.S., at 32. Thereafter, at 
37, theArgersingerv. Hamlin, supra, rul-
ing is extended to the deprivation of lib-
erty for any criminal offense. No men-
tion is made of what rights may be af-
forded to one who is susceptible to the 
loss of liberty, but who just happens to 
be charged with a civil offense. 
As the remainder of this memoran-
dum will point out, there seems to be a 
total disregard as to the constitutional 
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right to the assistance of counsel when 
the accused is charged under a civil con-
tempt statute. 
II. The Loss of Liberty Potential 
in Civil Contempt Actions Should Allow 
the Alleged Contemnor to Have the 
Right to the Assistance of Counce!. 
The law of contempt is largely 
judge-made law, and indeed judges and 
legislators have spoken of the "inhe-
rent" powers of the judiciary to punish 
for contempt even when legislative regu-
lations have been contrary. See Dobbs, 
Contempt of Courl: A Survey, 56 Cor-
nell L. Rev. 183, 185 (1971); Adkins, 
Code Revision in Maryland: The Courts 
and Judicial Proceedings Arlicle, 34 Md. 
L. Rev. 7, 13 (1974). Contempt of court 
has been described as an offense against 
the state, rather than against the judge 
personally, which is punishable because 
of the necessity of maintaining the dig-
nity of and respect toward the court and 
their decrees. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt 
§ 2. The power to punish for contempt is 
exercised to vindicate the court's dignity 
for disrespect shown to it or its orders, or 
to compel the performance of some 
order or decree whose performance is 
within the power of the contemnor. 17 
Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt § 2. One of the 
penalties which may be imposed for con-
tempt of court, whether characterized as 
civil or criminal, is the incarceration of 
the offending party. 
The reasoning ofArgersinger v. Ham-
lin, supra, in which the Court stated that 
"absent a knowing and intelligent 
waiver, no person may be imprisoned 
for any offense, whether classified as 
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unles he 
was represented by counsel at his trial," 
may have an application not only to the 
rights of an indigent charged with a mis-
demeanor (the issue in that case), but also 
to the rights of persons, whether indigent 
or not, charged with contempt of court. 
Since the contemnor may be deprived of 
his liberty in contempt proceedings, sev-
eral courts have stated that he is entitled to 
minimal due process and equal protection 
rights, among which is the right to counsel. 
SeeIn re Grand Jury, 468 F. 2d 1368 (9th 
Cir. 1972); Application of Shelly, 197 Cal. 
App. 2d 199,16 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1961);Ex 
parte Davis, 161 Tex. 561, 344 S.w. 2d 
153 (1961); Ex parte Hosken, 480 S.w. 
2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals observed in In 
re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra, that 
the threat of imprisonment is the coer-
cion that makes a civil contempt pro-
ceeding effective, and that the civil label 
did not obscure its penal nature. In that 
case an indigent who was charged with 
civil contempt for failing to answer fed-
eral grand jury questions pursuant to a 
court order was held to be entitled to 
court-appointed counsel in his contempt 
hearing. In Application of Shelly, supra, 
the court noted that a contempt proceed-
ing arising out of a civil action was, in a 
broad sense, regarded as a criminal pro-
ceeding. There the applicant was al-
lowed to waive his right to counsel even 
though he would have been afforded the 
due process right to counsel. Observing 
that a civil contempt hearing was quasi-
criminal in nature, the court in Ex parle 
Davis, supra, required that adequate 
time be furnished to one charged with 
civil contempt in order that he obtain 
representation by counsel in the con-
tempt proceedings. In that case the con-
temnor failed to make support payments 
required by a previous court order. And, 
in Ex parle Hosken, supra, the court said 
that contempt proceedings were often 
considered criminal or quasi-criminal in 
nature, and that a person faced with de-
privation of liberty had the constitutional 
right to be repsented by counse!' 
It should be noted that while con-
tempts are frequently classified as civil 
or criminal, there is a fundamental di-
cotomi between the two. See Gompers 
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 
418 (1911). As to the standards that are 
used to distinguish civil from criminal 
contempt actions, see Wright, et aI., Civil 
and Criminal Contempt in the Federal 
Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167 (1955); Beale, 
Contempt of Courl, Criminal and Civil, 21 
Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1908); Moskovitz, 
Contempt of Injuctions, Civil and Crimi-
nal, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780 (1943); 
Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in 
the Federal Courts. 57 Yale L. J. 83 
(1947). A criminal contempt proceeding 
has almost all of the safeguards of a 
normal criminal defendant. [The crimi-
nal contemnor may be pardoned. Ex 
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). 
The state can not appeal from an acquit-
tal. US. v. Bittner, 11 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 
1926). The defendant may refuse to tes-
tify. Cf. Michaelson v. US., 266 U.S. 42, 
66 (1924). The defendant is presumed 
to be innocent. Gompers v. Bucks Stove 
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444 
(1911).] Whereas, the civil contemnor 
has only the rights of any civil litigant. 
See Green v. US., 356 U.S. 165, 197 
(1958) (Black, J., dissenting). [For in-
stance, the civil contemnor is not entitled 
to a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to 
testify. American Pastry Products Corp. 
v. United Products Corp., 39 F.2d 181, 
183 (D. Mass. 1930). He is not favored 
by a presumption of innocence. Coca-
Cola Co. u. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364 
(S.D. Tex. 1934). Also, since confine-
ment may continue until the civil con-
temnor complies or purges himself (See 
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 
221 U.S. 418 (1911) ), the open-ened 
sentence imposed on the civil contem-
nor theoretically can continue indefi-
nitely and without the possibility of 
executive pardon. In re NeVitt, 117 Fed. 
448 (8th Cir. 1902).] 
The obvious question thereby pres-
ents itself: Why should the civil contem-
nor not be entitled to the same rights as 
the criminal contempt defendant? The 
superficial answer to this question is that 
civil contemnors do not need the 
safeguards of criminal procedure or of 
constitutional law because they "carry 
the keys of their prison in their own 
pocket." In re NeVitt, supra, at 461. 
Judge Sanborn's rationalization in that 
case has influenced the subsequent his-
tory of civil contempt in the United 
States. Comment, The Coercive Func-
tion of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 120, 125, n. 28 (1965). However, 
civil contemnors may not actually carry 
the keys in their pockets. Both com-
pliance and inability to comply are com-
plete defenses to coercive imprisonment 
proceedings. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 
56, 76 (1948); U.S. v. Jaeger, 117 F.2d 
483 (2dCir. 1941). The contemnor may 
have complied already or may be incap~ 
able of such action, yet the determina-
tion of these facts is made without certain 
criminal safeguards even though impris-
onment hinges of the outcome of that 
determination. Comment, The Coercive 
Function of Civil Contempt, supra, at 
125. 
Another possible justification for dif-
fering between the rights of civil and 
criminal contempt defendants rests on 
the function of the civil contempt. Civil 
contempt proceedings do not seek to 
punish the defendant, but they are insti-
tuted to benefit the complaining party. 
See US. v. UM. w., 330 U.S. 258 
(1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co., supra; MacNeil v. US., 236 
F. 2d 149 (lstCir. 1956). And, granting 
additional safeguards to the civil con-
temnor is directly opposed to the inter-
ests of the complainant, to whom the 
contemnor owes a duty by reason of a 
prior judicial decree. Imprisoning an in-
dividual, however, without traditional 
criminal safeguards is against the spirit of 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, and Gi-
deon v. Wainwright, supra. 
The resolution of the above conflict 
then would seem to require a balancing 
of interests between the two parties to 
the proceeding. Once a judgment on the 
merits has been entered both parties 
have already had their day in court, and 
the threat of imprisonment is only used 
to enforce compliance with that judg-
ment. The contemnor faces imprison-
ment while the complainant wants to en-
force his right to the prior judgment. 
The right to enforce judgments is not 
questioned here. However, the threat of 
incarceration directed towards the al-
leged civil contemnor is such a drastic 
step that modem notions of due process 
and equal protection clearly require that 
minimal criminal safeguards, such as the 
right to counsel, be guaranteed. See 
Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69; Gi-
deon v. Wainwright, supra, at 344; 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 40. 
The threat of incarceration in a trial 
setting should be enough, in itself, to ac-
tivate the right to counsel requirement as 
was mandated inArgersinger v. Hamlin, 
supra. Even though a civil contempt 
hearing is not deemed to be classified as 
a criminal offense, such proceeding is 
held in a courtroom and is presided over 
by a trial judge. At the enforcement pro-
ceedings, some states, including Mary-
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land and New Jersy, even allow the 
State's attorney to prosecute the con-
tempt actions as though they were crim-
inal case. See, e.g., Maryland Rules of 
Procedure, Rule P4, §d(l) and the 
Editor's note thereto. Thus, the power of 
the court and of the state's prosecutorial 
resources are set against the alleged con-
temnor in a trial setting. 
"The assistance of counsel is often 
a requisite to the very existence of 
a fair tria\''' 
Argersingerv. Hamlin, supra, at31. The 
courts should not be so enamored with 
the forms of actions that they lose sight of 
their protection of one's constitutional 
rights. 
Two recent decisions have come to 
opposite conclusions regarding the right 
to counsel in civil contempt proceedings 
brought to enforce previously adjudi-
cated support orders: Duval v. Duval, 
322 A. 2d 1 (N.H. 1974) and Otton v. 
Zaborac, 525 P. 2d 537 (Alaska 1974). 
The remainder of this section will discuss 
the implications of these two cases. 
In Otton v. Zaborac, supra, the appel-
lant, a divorce, failed to make child sup-
port payments and was ordered to show 
cause why he should not be held in con-
tempt. At the contempt hearing, appel-
lant was asked whether he wanted a jury 
trial, but he was not advised of his right to 
counsel. Appellant opted to be tried by 
the judge, who held the appellant in con-
tempt and jailed him. The Alaskan Sup-
reme Court held "that an indigent in a 
contempt for nonsupport proceeding 
has a right to a court - appointed attor-
ney." 525 P. 2d, at 538. The reasoning 
for that decision was based on the a-
vailability of a jury trial in civil contempt 
proceedings for nonsupport (Johansen 
v. State, 491 P. 2d 759 (Alaska 1971) ) 
and on the seriousness of the potential 
deprivation of liberty. The right to a jury 
trial would have been a hollow right if the 
appellant could not have been heard 
through counsel. The court quoted from 
Powell v. Alabama, supra, stating that 
" '[t]he right to be heard by coun-
sel would be, in many cases, of lit-
tle avail if it did not comprehend 
the right to be heard by counse!.' 
287, U.S., at 68-69." 
525 P. 2d, at 539. Also, the potential de-
privation of liberty was a serious penal 
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matter even though the contempt 
charged was traditionally civil in nature, 
and that imprisonment through the 
courts was equal to "state action which 
brings into play the due process clause." 
525 P. 2d, at 538, 539. 
Duval v. Duval, supra, concerns the 
same factual setting in which a divorce 
failed to make support payments and 
was held in contempt of court. At the 
contempt hearing, the defendant was 
without the services of counsel. The 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire 
noted that "due process does not re-
quire the right to counsel in every in-
stance where the possibility of incarcera-
tion exists, but depends instead on cir-
cumstances which show that the defen-
dant would be treated unfairly if the as-
sistance of counsel were not provided." 
322 A. 2d, at 4. The court based its ruling 
on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, Morrissey 
v. Brewer, supra and Justice Powell's 
concurring opinion in Argersinger v. 
Hamlin. Without a transcript of the con-
tempt hearing procided to them, the 
court remanded the case to determine 
"whether the issues presented below 
were of a complex nature or whether the 
defendant was without resources to ob-
tain adequate representation without 
substantial hardship to himself or his 
family." 322 A, 2d, at 4. Also, the court 
stated that theArgersinger right to coun-
sel decision was "inapplicable to a civil 
contempt action because that right is 
confined to criminal proceedings." 322 
A. 2d, at 3. The capability of the defen-
dant to speak for himself, "the character 
of the proceedings and the complexity of 
the issues were all to be considered in 
any civil contempt case where the right 
to consel was sought. 322 A. 2d, at 3-4. 
Both of these decisions are well-
written, but their conclusions vary as 
much as the Argersinger and Gagnon 
cases. It should be noted that Otton v. 
Zaborac, supra, never noted Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli, supra. Equal emphasis should 
show that Duval v. Duval, supra, lightly 
glossed over the concept of state action 
in the imprisonment of the contemnor. 
In support of Otton v. Zaborac, supra, 
the case of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 
does not need citing since the probation 
revocation hearing involved there was 
so dissimilar from a trial that different 
due process protections were accorded 
in each. 
"[T]here are critical differences 
between criminal trials and proba-
tion or parole revocation hear-
ings, and both society and the 
probationer or parolee have 
stakes in preserving these differ-
ences." 
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 788-
789. At revocation hearings, "the state is 
represented not by a prosecutor but by a 
parole officer [who is concerned with re-
habilitation]; formal procedures and 
rules of evidence are not employed .... 
The need for counsel at a revocation 
hearing derives not from the invariable 
attributes of those hearings but rather 
from the pecularities of particular cases." 
411 U.S., at 789. The probationer or 
parolee has already been convicted at a 
trial. Therefore, he has a more limited 
due process right than does a criminal 
defendant in a trial. As such, the civil 
contemnor has more dissimilarities with 
a probationer or parolee than with a 
criminal defendant. All four parties stand 
the possibility of incarceration, but 
ONLY the civil contemnor has been de-
nied the right to counsel at his trial. 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o 
State shall ... deprive any person oLlib-
erty ... without due process of law." Itis a 
reasonable argument that imprisonment 
to coerce compliance with a state court 
action amounts to state action. As such, 
a denial of due process should at least be 
raised when the state provides the re-
medy of incarcerating a civil contemnor 
to enforce his payment of a prior state 
court support decree. It may be a per-
sonal remedy to the complainant, but 
the state courts enforce the punishment 
of the civil contemnor. Perhaps that is 
how the Duval v. Duval court came to 
deny counsel to certain civil contemnors: 
The issue of state action may not have 
been raised. 
As stated, supra, the Duval court's re-
liance on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, 
may have been misdirected. The issue of 
proViding counsel in a probation or 
parole revocation hearing is not equiva-
lent to providing counsel in a civil con-
tempt trial. The probationer and parolee 
have already had trials to determine their 
guilt. They both have had the right to 
counsel at their trials. Therefore, their 
revocation hearings are nof used to de-
termine guilt or innocence - that has al-
ready been determined at their trials. 
On the other hand, a civil contemnor 
needs the guidance of counsel even if he 
will plead guilty to the charge of failing to 
comply with a support order. 
"Couns~lis needed so that the 
accused may know precisely what 
he is doing, so that he is fully 
aware of the prospect of going to 
jail or in prison, and so that he is 
treated fairly by the prosecution. " 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34. 
The civil contemnor should not be 
forced to stand alone against the com-
bined powers of the complainant, the 
judge and the prosecutor. Since some 
states, including Maryland and New Jer-
sey, provide for their State's attorney to 
prosecute the civil contempt case, the 
unlimited state prosecutorial resources 
can be thrown against the civil contem-
nor. See Maryland Rules of Procedure, 
Rule P4, § l(d) and Editor's note 
thereto. !t therefore seems reasonable to 
allow the civil contemnor to at least have 
the assistance of counsel in the prepara-
tion of his defense. Without that minimal 
guarantee the state is taking unnecessary 
advantage of the civil contemnor. 
The next section will focus on the right 
to counsel for civil contemnors in Mary-
land. 
HI. The Civil Contempt Proceeding 
Under the Maryland Rules of 
Procedure Brought to Enforce a 
Previously Adjudicated Support Order 
Violates the Alleged Contemnor's 
Right to Counsel. 
Under a former provision in Maryland 
law, the legislature purported to limit the 
power of the courts to inflict summary 
punishment for contempt. Md. Ann. 
Code Art. 26, § 34 (1973). This Section 
4 was of questionable validity because of 
judicial decisions holding that the power 
to punish summarily for contempt was 
inherent in a court of record and was not 
subject to legislative limitation. See 
Robinson v. State, 19 Md. App. 20, 308 
A. 2d 712 (1973). !twas recognized that 
it would have been unconstitutional for 
the legislature to remove from the courts 
their inherent contempt powers. Balti-
more Radio Show v. State, 193 Md. 
300,57 A. 2d 697 (1948), cert. denied, 
388 U.S. 912 (1950). The current con-
tempt of court provision, Md. Ann. Code 
Courts and Judicial Proceeding Act § 
1-202 (a), merely notes that "[a] court 
may exercise the power to punish for 
contempt...in the manner described in 
the Maryland Rules .... " The old language 
was removed, and the development of 
the law of contempt is left to the courts. 
The statute has been brought into con-
formity with the actual state of the law. 
Adkins, Code Revision in Maryland: The 
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, 
34 Md. L. Rev. 7, 13 (1974). 
Coercive imprisonment is a powerful 
judicial tool. Its use in Maryland is gov-
erned only by court decisions, and its 
application is guided by the Maryland 
Rules of Procedure, Rule P. In relation to 
the present inquiry in civil contempts 
brought to enforce a prior support order, 
some other applicable rules are Mary-
land Rules of Procedure, Rules 636, 685 
and 719. Within this general framework 
analysis can begin. 
As stated, the judiciary has a powerful 
tool in which it may coercively enforce 
court orders. The courts should deter-
mine prior to trial just what the nature of 
contempts proceedings are. Hare v. 
Hare, 21 Md. App. 71, 318 A. 2d 234 
(1974). Contempts are classified into 
two categories, which are: (1) direct or 
constructive, and (2) civil or criminal. 
Md. Rules of Procedure, Rule P, §§ 2, 3, 
4. The contempts are not mutually exc-
lusive, and overlapping may result. Roll 
v. State, 15 Md. App. 31, 288 A. 2d 605, 
614 (1972). The line of distinction be-
tween civil and criminal contempt is 
often indistinct, and often the same acts 
or omissions may constitute both or, at 
least, embrace aspects of both. Roll v. 
State, supra, 288 A. 2d, at 621; State v. 
Roll, 267 Md. 714, 298 A. 2d 867, at 
876. In spite of the verbiage that is used 
to designate contempt proceedings, they 
are neither wholly civil nor criminal. 
Grohman v. State, 258 Md. 552, 267 A. 
2d 193, 195 (1970). But, it is generally 
agreed that if any part of a contempt sen-
tence is punishment, then the contempt 
must be classified as a criminal one. Roll 
v. State, supra, 288 A. 2d, at 621; State 
v. Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 876. If the 
contempt is willful, then it should be clas-
sified as a criminal one. State v. Roll, 
supra, 298 A. 2d, at 877. (As to defini-
tion of "willful," see Ewell v. State, 207 
Md. 288,299, 114 A. 2d66, 72 (1955).) 
The idea apparent from the complex of 
rules demonstrated above is that one 
needs a counselor to help him figure 
them out. 
A jail sentence for civil contempt will 
be suspended if one purges himself. But, 
the imprisonment may be avoided al-
together if the civil contemnor shows 
that he has neither the money nor the 
ability to pay. McDaniel v. McDaniel, 
256 Md. 684,262 A. 2d 52,55 (1970). 
This interpretation of Md. Rule 636 deal-
ing with the enforcement of orders by 
contempt refines and limits the court's 
power to charge one with contempt. 
But, the problem remains as to how ef-
fectively one charged with contempt can 
communicate his situation with the 
judge. As such, the simple solution lies in 
affording the contemnor the right to 
counsel. 
The typical situation involved in the 
violation of a support decree isthe case 
of husband or paramour who neglects to 
pay child support. One case interpreting 
Md. Rule PI has said that the fact that a 
husband is in contempt will not prevent 
his litigating his substantial rights in con-
nection with which the contempt was 
committed. Rethorst v. Rethorst, 214 
Md. 1, 133 A. 2d 101 (1957). The pro-
cedure to be followed by courts is gener-
ally regulated by Md. Rule P4, § b deal-
ing with the notice to defendant. One 
case interpreting this rule has stated that 
courts must observe the rights of defen-
dants, and such rights include those 
within the amorphous bundle called 
"due process of law." Roll v. State, 
supra, 288 A. 2d, at 617. When such 
notice to defendant is issued, the court 
shall allow a reasonable time for the pre-
paration of one's defense and the essen-
tial facts constituting the contempt 
charge. Reamer v. Reamer, 246 Md. 
532, 229 A. 2d 74, 76 (1967). 
In the preparation of his deffense, the 
alleged contemnor should have the as-
sistance of counsel. Otherwise, it would 
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seem that the alleged contemnor could 
hardly meet his burden of proof. In viola-
tion of support orders, it is generally rec-
ognized that in the proceedings insti-
tuted to coerce payment of the ordered 
sums the burden is upon the alleged con-
temnor to prove his inability to comply 
with the order. 53 A. L. R. 2d 591. Since 
inability to pay is a complete defense, it is 
very important for the alleged contem-
nor to plan his defense adequately. The 
best way to plan a defense, however, is 
with the able assistance of an attomey, 
who would best know how to present 
the case to the judge and how to arrange 
an equitable solution with the State's At-
tomey. 
If the contemnor is indigent, then it 
does not seem possible for him to 
employ effective counsel. And, the fact 
that he may be indigent does not insure 
that he can convince the judge of his in-
ability to pay. Coercive imprisonment is 
remedial, of course, only when the de-
fendant is able to comply. Maggio v. 
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948). And, as 
the Supreme Court said, " ... to jail one 
for a contempt for omitting an act he is 
powerless to perform ... would ... make 
the proceeding purely punitive, to de-
scribe it charitably." 333 U.S., at 72. 
This is true because imprisoning a de-
fendant incapable of performance can-
not possibly cause him to take action to 
benefit the complainant. 
The Maryland Rules of Procedure, 
Rule P4, § a, allows the institution of 
constructive contempts by "the court on 
its own motion, by the State's attomey 
or by any person having actual knowl-
edge of the alleged contempt." After the 
proceeding is instituted, the defendant is 
issued a show cause order requiring him 
to show cause why he should not be held 
in contempt. Md. Rule P4, § b. It is clear 
that simply citing the defendant to sholN 
cause why he should not be held in con-
tempt is not the equivalent of adjudicat-
ing him in contempt. Gatuso v. Gatuso, 
16 Md. App. 632,299 A. 2d 113, 115 
(1973). The court may, also, appoint the 
State's Attorney or any other member of 
the Bar to prosecute the case. State v. 
Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 878. So many 
of these procedures partake of the na-
ture of a criminal proceeding that it 
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seems illusory to call the action a "civil" 
contempt. Courts should be more con-
cemed with the constitutional rights of 
defendants than they are with mere 
forms or labels attached to proceedings. 
The Argersinger ruling should be ex-
tended to the case of a civil contemnor 
since such action has many of the attri-
butes of a criminal action, except for the 
name civil. The only problem would 
seem to be statutory authority for the 
appointment of counsel in Maryland. 
The next issue of THE FORUM will pose 
such a solution. 
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Parental 
Responsibility 
in Maryland 
for Torts of 
Minor Children 
by Robert Lankin 
At common law, the parent - child re-
lationship alone is an insufficient basis 
for holding the parent liable for the torts 
of his minor child. Kerrigan v. Carroll, 
168 Md. 682, 179 A. 53 (1935). Under 
the common law, however, there are 
many examples where the parent be-
comes liable for the intentional torts of 
his minor children. Liability is often 
based on the parent's knowledge or im-
puted knowledge concerning the vicious 
propensities of the child to do acts which 
would injure persons or property. The 
mere knowledge however, of this dispo-
sition is not of itself sufficient to impose 
liability upon the parent. Conde! v. Savo, 
350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944). The 
